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In an article written for a festschrift some years ago, I re-
ferred to the "bifocal" world of international sales law.1 This
was meant to signify the application of two bodies of law of dif-
ferent character to international sales transactions of different
types. More exactly, it represented the effort demanded of a
sales law exponent in focusing on both the broad principles laid
down in the UN Sales Convention 19802 (usually known as the
CISG) and the finely detailed provision of English sales law in
the matter of commodity sales. The metaphor had a certain au-
tobiographical poignancy: its origins lay in a recent visit to an
optometrist.
Uniform law represents a part of that phenomenon that we call
globalization; a word that means so many different things to so
many different people and ought on that account be used spar-
ingly, perhaps with a modest financial forfeit that upon suffi-
cient accumulation would be paid over to charitable causes.
Those of us participating in one or more of the incremental ef-
forts to bring about uniform law are, fortunately, sufficiently
obscure to be spared the attentions of anti-globalization protes-
tors. The United Nations Commission on International Trade
* Professor of Commercial Law and Dean of the Faculty of Laws, University
College, London. This article is an edited version of a speech originally presented
at the Pace University School of Law 2002 Blain Sloan Lecture.
1 See Michael G. Bridge, The Bifocal World of International Sales: Vienna
and Non-Vienna, in MAKING COMMERCIAL LAW 277, 277-96 (R. Cranston ed., 1997).
2 See United Nations Conventions of Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 reprinted in [1980] XI UNCITRAL YEARBOOK
149, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/
partllchapterX/treatyl7.asp [hereinafter CISGI.
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Law (UNCITRAL)3 is dedicated to the pursuit of uniform law.
Its mission is revealed in stark clarity by the preamble to the
CISG, which, in addition to stating that uniformity will reduce
barriers to international trade, provides that "the development
of international trade on the basis of equality and mutual bene-
fit is an important element in promoting friendly relations
among States."
A cynic might wonder how such a sentiment adds nobility
to the mundane detail of the rights and duties of buyers and
sellers under the CISG and might also recall that, in the Euro-
pean wars of the 1660s, the Dutch were selling arms to the
French forces invading their country. But if that sentiment is
to be criticized, it is for overstatement rather than inaccuracy.
International collaboration in the cause of uniformity assists
mutual understanding and encourages neighborliness.
The CISG in its short life4 has already proved itself to be a
wonderfully effective instrument. It should not, however, be
thought that all international sales are alike and that one sin-
gle uniform sales law should be provided on a "one size fits all"
basis. One of my purposes today is to lay emphasis upon the
variety of international sales transactions and to make out a
case for the continuing availability of governing laws of differ-
ent character to suit this variety. As much as I admire the ac-
complishments of the international uniformity movement, there
is a case to be made for national legal systems to continue to
play a vigorous part in the world of international sales. I shall
deal by way of example with the character of English law as the
governing law of choice in commodities transactions - an act of
some temerity in this of all cities - and lay stress on the specu-
lative character of the world of forward delivery trading that
English law serves.5 I shall then turn to the CISG, as part of
the ambitious efforts currently in train to develop a world legal
3 See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
Y.B. VIII, 48-49, paras. 323-30, 336-40, A/CN.9/SER.A/1977.
4 The Convention came into force in 1988 when it acquired the requisite
number of ratifications. The number of Contracting States has now reached sixty-
one.
5 For the view that a principle of good faith and fair dealing has no part to
play in commodity sales, see Michael G, Bridge, Good Faith in Commercial Con-
tracts, in GOOD FAITH IN CONTRACT: CONCEPT AND CONTEXT 139, 139-64 (Roger
Brownsword et al. eds., 1999).
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order, to explore the character of uniform law, and in that con-
nection, I shall also deal with an instrument that is similar in
tone but quite different in type, the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts 1994.6 In promoting the
cause of uniform law in international sale, the Pace Law School
is in the vanguard. Pace's on-line achievements in marshalling
case reports, translations and secondary literature, and in pro-
moting the cause of uniform law, command the highest respect.
7
These efforts have earned the gratitude of scholars, practicing
lawyers, judges, and arbitrators across the world. I have found
the achievements of this law school invaluable in my own work.
The word "uniformity" in connection with transnational
substantive law commands a certain understanding, though
what constitutes true uniformity in the law of international
sale, when States maintain non-uniform bodies of private law
and procedural law upon which that uniform law sits, is a dif-
ferent matter. In the case of English law and commodities
sales, it may seem odd to speak of uniformity - since I am
making a case for diversity - but I shall demonstrate, by refer-
ence to the structure of multiple sales transactions in this field,
that the word is not out of place in describing the character of
English sales law. In demonstrating a case for the continuing
existence of English law as the law of choice in commodities
sales, sitting alongside a uniform law informed by the CISG and
other instruments, I hope to show that this is not a blemish on
the uniformity movement but rather a recognition of the com-
pelling need for diversity. Sales transactions cannot be assumed
to-be homogeneous in character. There is a grain of truth in the
old story about the large quantity of tins of sardines sold on CIF
(cost, insurance and freight) terms. The end buyer complains to
its seller about the inedible character of the sardines, only to be
told that they were not eating sardines at all but buying-and-
selling sardines. It should not be a cause for reproach that bulk
oil sold on CIF Rotterdam terms is governed by a body of law
quite different in character from the law that applies to the sale
.6 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Principles of In-
ternational Commercial Contracts (Rome 1994), available at http://www.unidroit.
org/english/principles/chapter-l.htm [hereinafter UNIDROIT Principles]. These
are not contained in a treaty and are designed for multiple purposes, including a
model law.
7 See http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu.
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of clothing items by an Italian fashion house to a German retail
store.
I. COMMODITY SALES AND ENGLISH LAW
For various reasons, some of them historical, English law
plays a leading role as the governing law of international com-
modities sales.8 The great majority of reported cases involve
transactions and parties that have no physical connection at all
with the United Kingdom. The leading role played by English
law and by the rules and by-laws of the Liverpool Cotton Trad-
ing Association has been noted by Professor Bernstein in her
study on cotton sales,9 though cotton sales do not feature in the
reported case law, which instead is concentrated heavily on
grain and feedstuffs, with oil playing an increasing role in re-
cent years. 10 A quite typical example of a transaction uncon-
nected with England would be a sale, by an Argentinean seller
to a Swiss buyer, of soya bean meal in bulk to be loaded in a
Gulf of Mexico port on CIF Antwerp terms and paid for in cash
against documents in U.S. dollars. The law reports will not de-
clare the flag of the ship, but one can expect it to be one of the
usual flags of convenience. The economics of shipping favor
bulk cargoes destined for the handful of North European ports
that are large enough to accommodate the bulk carriers (the so-
called ARA ports of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Antwerp),
where cargoes can be broken up for transshipment to other des-
tinations." The concentration of cargo destinations favors the
phenomenon of string trading, where multiple parties deal suc-
8 The major English commodities traders were long ago absorbed by multina-
tional traders. Judging by the parties' names in cases reported in Lloyd's Law re-
ports, the leading source of reported cases in this area, it will be very rare for a
case to involve an English party.
9 See generally Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Indus-
try: Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms and Institutions, in John M. Olin
Law & Economics Working Paper No 133 2d Series 1-2 (The Law School, The Uni-
versity of Chicago), available at http://www.law.uchicago.eduLawecon/WkngPprs-
126-150/133.1b.cotton.pdf, citing e-mail from Linda Mawdsley, Membership Man-
ager, Liverpool Cotton Exchange, to author (Oct. 27, 1997).
10 See generally MICHAEL G. BRIDGE, THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS Chs.
4-5 (1999).
11 Cargo quantities may be multiples of the carrying capacity of barges on the
River Rhine. See Andre & Cie. S.A. v. Tradax Export S.A., [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep.
352, 354.
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cessively with the same cargo, the success of which is dependent
on uniformity of a sort.12
String trading is a product of speculative activity in that
only the shipper and the end buyer have physical dealings with
the goods. Intermediate parties deal only with documents and
then only in the absence of a truncated delivery of the docu-
ments, where delivery is made directly to the end buyer and the
documents are not handled at intervals in the string. Further-
more, intermediate contracts may be closed out for one or more
reasons, so as to become financial differences contracts. In the
world of stable oil prices that preceded the Arab-Israeli War of
1973, oil was commonly sold on spot terms in major centers
such as Rotterdam. The conditions of shortage and price vola-
tility that followed the war encouraged the development of for-
ward trading and string contracts, which in the oil trade go
under the name of daisy chains. Oil companies are keen to re-
tain strategic freedom for as long as possible when determining
the ultimate destination of oil cargoes, hence the practice of con-
signing cargoes to Gibraltar or other ports to await further or-
ders, 13 and the practice of selling bulk cargoes on CIF "basis
Rotterdam" terms, the expectation being that the vessel may be
later ordered to discharge in a refinery away from Rotterdam. 14
Conditions in the oil trade are different from those in the dry
commodities trade: cargoes are not dispatched to just a few des-
tinations to be broken up for transshipment to other destina-
tions. The use of "basis Rotterdam" clauses, however,
concentrates the trade and encourages string trading activity.
12 It is often said of string contracts that they are identical save as to price
(though it is also possible for the quantities to be different, as might occur where a
trader splits a larger purchase contract to fulfill two resale contracts).
13 In such a case, the seller (more accurately in string sales the head seller or
shipper) will also be the charterer of the ship and therefore in a position to order
the ship to a named port. For examples of the destination port being determined
in mid-voyage, see generally Mallozzi v. Carapelli S.A., [1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 407;
Gatoil International Inc. v. Tradax Petroleum Ltd. (The Rio Sun), [1985] 1 Lloyd's
Rep. 350.
14 Oil contracts on CIF terms are focused on the arrival of the goods at the
discharge port in a way that dry goods contracts are not, a distinction that would
seem to be due to the lesser degree of flexibility in accommodating the discharge of
oil cargoes, which dictates a need to know when the tanker will in fact present
itself for unloading. For an example of the difficulty in calculating arrival times
under "basis Rotterdam" contracts, see generally P & 0 Oil Trading Ltd. v. Scanoil
AB, [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 389.
20031
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Now, if string trading is regarded as beneficial and is to be
encouraged, then it requires a uniform product. Grain and simi-
lar products do not roll out of nature's granary with the reliable
quality of a BMW assembly line. They are dependent on condi-
tions of sun, rain and soil. This means that a method must be
found to classify them in a standard way. In the case of Cana-
dian grain exports, this is done by the Canadian Grain Commis-
sion, 15 a department of the federal government. Canadian
western red spring wheat, to take just one example, comes in
three quality grades, the properties of each being described me-
ticulously in an official guide. 16 There must also be a reliable
source of supply, which means that forward trading in North
American grain is much more likely than similar trading in
Ukrainian grain (though that may change as the Ukraine redis-
covers the market). In the oil market, Brent crude from the
North Sea is a favored product for forward trading activity since
it is produced in reliable quantities, 17 in a climate that is not too
harsh, and in conditions of political stability.
String trading also requires a reliable standard form that
can be used at all stages in the string. North American grain
and soya is commonly dealt with on the standard forms issued
by trading associations based in London, namely, Grain and
Feed Trade Association (GAFTA) and Federation of Oil Seeds
and Fats Associations (FOSFA). The standard forms have a
lengthy pedigree and are constantly refined in the light of expe-
rience. Perhaps the most famous of these, the GAFTA 100 con-
tract (bulk feeding stuffs tale quale on CIF terms), dates back
more than 100 years.' 8 The value of legal certainty in the shape
15 See generally Canada Grain Act, available at http://www.cgc.ca. Under the
Canada Grain Act, R.S.C. 2000, the "Commission shall, in the interests of the
grain producers, establish and maintain standards of quality for Canadian grain
.. to ensure a dependable commodity for domestic and export markets." Canada
Grain Act § 13. To that end, it "shall, in furtherance of its objects, (a) recommend
and establish grain grades and standards for those grades and implement a sys-
tem of grading and inspection for Canadian grain to reflect adequately the quality
of that grain and meet the need for efficient marketing in and outside Canada
.... "Id.
16 See Official Grain Grading Guide 4-26, § 14(1)(a) (Aug. 1, 2001), available
at http://www.cgc.ca/pubs/ggg/2001/04-wheat-e-2000.pdf.
17 See the account of the expert's report as discussed in Voest Alpine Inter-
trading GmbH v. Chevron International Oil Co Ltd., [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 547.
18 It used to be Form No. 1 of the Liverpool Corn Trading Association.
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of a consistent line of decisions is obvious; likewise, the eleva-
tion of the standard form so that it performs a function not dis-
similar to private legislation in a designated field of economic
activity. Legal certainty is also enhanced by the rule that mat-
ters of interpretation are treated as raising issues of law so that
the finding of a trial judge or an arbitrator may be overturned
by an appellate court. 19 This is far removed from the attitude in
some civilian jurisdictions that interpretation is a matter for
the trial court's sovereign powers of assessment. 20
Besides being more recent, string trading in crude oil - tak-
ing Brent Crude as an example (another important benchmark
crude is West Texas Intermediate) - has been dominated by
the forms published by the oil majors, BP and Shell. In the par-
allel futures market, the International Petroleum Exchange
makes available a Brent Crude contract that serves as a hedg-
ing instrument and trading mechanism, and is designed to sit
well with forward trading in the physical market.21 It contem-
plates physical delivery but gives an option to settle in cash
against the published settlement price on the day following the
last trading day for the futures contract.22 Given the market-
driven activity of those dealing with physical commodities, and
the latter's connection to the futures market, it is no small won-
der that contractual discipline and certainty are the typifying
features of English case law arising out of the sale of commodi-
ties, whether these are wet (oil) or dry (grain and soya).
Just as string trading needs a uniform physical product
and a uniform standard form contract, so too it needs uniform-
ity in choice of jurisdiction and choice of law. The standard
19 See Andre & Cie. S.A. v. Tradax Export S.A., [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 352, 354.
20 For example, see the commentary to Article 1156 Code Civil (Dalloz) (inten-
tion of the parties a matter for the "juges du fond").
21 Referring to the Brent Crude futures contract,
[iut is tailored specifically to meet the oil industry's need for an interna-
tional crude oil futures contract and is an integral part of the Brent pric-
ing complex, which also includes spot and forward markets. The Brent
pricing complex is used to price over 65% of the world's traded crude oil.
The IPE Brent Crude futures contract is a deliverable contract based on
EFP (exchange of futures for physical) delivery with an option to cash
settle.
International Petroleum Exchange of London, Ltd., available at http://www.ipe.uk.
com/contracts/bcf_index.asp.
22 See id.
2003]
7
PACE INT'L L. REV.
GAFTA and FOSFA forms, for example, are firm in the selec-
tion of England and English law. According to the so-called
domicile clause in GAFTA 100:
Buyers and Sellers agree that, for the purpose of proceedings ei-
ther legal or by arbitration, this contract shall be deemed to have
been made in England, and to be performed there . . . and the
Courts of England or Arbitrators appointed in England . . . shall
... have exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes which may arise
under this contract. Such disputes shall be settled according to
the law of England, whatever the domicile, residence or place of
business of the parties to this contract may be or become .... 23
The fiction of place of formation and domicile of parties is
designed, however, implausible that fiction may be, to make the
choice of English law binding despite the absence of any mate-
rial connection of parties or contract to England.24 In so doing,
it is consistent with modern developments in choice of law and,
in particular, with the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable
to Contractual Obligations 1980,25 to which the United King-
dom is a party. We are therefore left with identical contracts in
string in which the only differentiating elements are the price
and (sometimes) the quantity, the latter being dealt with in
standard amounts that can be broken up into standard units for
multiple buyers.
How then does the string come into being? Imagine first a
multiplicity of bilateral contracts entered into at different times
for a stated quantity of soya bean meal, shipment in a Gulf of
Mexico port of the seller's choice in August on CIF Antwerp
terms. 26 There will be many more contracts than there are
available cargoes. A study some years ago found about nine
23 Contract for Shipment of Feedingstuffs in Bulk No.100, cl. 31 (THE GRAIN
AND FEED TRADE ASS'N) (Effective Oct. 1, 1995) [hereinafter GAFTA 1001.
24 Prior to the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obliga-
tions, which came into force in the UK with the Contracts (Law Applicable) Act
1990, English Law permitted a free choice of applicable law (as indeed does the
Rome Convention, subject to certain limitations), but required that choice to be
"bona fide and legal." See Vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. Ltd.,
[1939] A.C. 277.
25 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 1980,
June 19, 1980 O.J. (L266), available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/ec.applicable.
law.contracts.1980/ [hereinafter Rome Convention].
26 The order in which the contracts are concluded by no means dictates the
order in which they come in the string.
[Vol. 15:55
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contracts for each cargo in the Brent market for FOB crude
oil.27 At first, nothing connects these different contracts but
they can be fitted to the number of available physical cargoes by
the notice of appropriation process, which permits traders to
match their buying and selling commitments. Basically, a
seller with a broad selling obligation of the type just stated
gives a notice of appropriation, which identifies a particular
cargo by reference to a bill of lading and thus locks the contract
onto that cargo.28 This notice is a pre-tender operation in that
the tender of the shipping documents themselves occurs at a
later date in line with the contents of the notice of appropria-
tion.29 This action is repeated by the buyer in turn in its char-
acter of seller to another party until a contractual sequence is
created between the original shipper and the last buyer in
string.
The string trading system generally functions well. It per-
mits closing out arrangements in defined circumstances, which
include the insolvency of an intermediate party in the string,30
but it can occasionally come to grief, as it did when the United
States Department of Commerce, as a result of flooding in the
upper Mississippi Valley in spring 1973, issued a partial prohi-
bition of export with certain exceptions. 31 The effect of this act
of governmental intervention was to reduce shipments and pre-
vent strings being formed by notices of appropriation. The re-
sult was described by an English judge as a "man-made
disaster," with over fifty reported cases and one thousand arbi-
trations, all contributing to the invisible exports of the City of
London. 32
27 See generally Voest Alpine Intertrading GmbH v. Chevron International
Oil Co. Ltd., [19871 2 Lloyd's Rep. 547.
28 See GAFTA 100, supra note 23, at cl. 10.
29 In effect, a notice of appropriation amounts to an offer to tender a particu-
lar cargo in fulfillment of the seller's more generic contractual obligation. See Bor-
rowman, Phillips and Co. v. Free & Hollis, [1878-79] 2R4 Q.B.D. 500.
30 See GAFTA 100, supra note 23, at cl. 30, "the contract shall be closed out at
the market price ruling on the business day following the giving of the [insolvency]
notice." Id. The insolvent party may, according to the market, profit from the
contract.
31 See generally Michael G. Bridge, The 1973 Mississippi Floods: 'Force
Majeure' and Prohibition of Export, in FORCE MAJEURE AND FRUSTRATION OF CON-
TRACT 287, 287-303 (Ewan McKendrick ed., 2d. ed. 1995).
32 Tradax Export S.A. v. Andr6 & Cie. S.A., [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 516, 526.
2003]
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The commodities market is a highly speculative market
and is dominated by major corporations able to withstand what
are sometimes extreme movements in the market. Physical
trading is unregulated. Rules that exist on derivatives and fu-
tures exchanges in relation to abusive behavior, such as market
manipulation, and in relation to margin deposits33 and mark-to-
market calculations, 34 have no part to play in the forward (or
physical) market. Nevertheless, a case can be made that the
application of strict contractual standards, by way of both the
general law and the standard trading terms themselves, per-
form a disciplinary function. This can be seen in the strict time
protocols governing the passing on of notices of appropriation to
constitute the sales string.35 These must be done promptly (on
the same day, but with some measure of latitude) in order to
avoid manipulative behavior in the market as traders might
otherwise delay passing on notices in order to secure the best
possible match of purchase and resale commitments. 36 In addi-
tion, though each sale is a bilateral affair, the systemic integrity
of the string as a whole is recognized by the burden placed on all
traders, not only to pass on notices in time but also to guarantee
that all prior parties too have passed on their notices in a timely
fashion.37 This is but one example of a contractual apparatus
that is at times expressed in multilateral as well as bilateral
terms.38
33 This is the security that has to be deposited in a margin account in the case
of short sales and purchases on margin. In the former case, the seller will not yet
have purchased what it is selling, and so will be vulnerable to a later upturn in the
market; in the latter case, the purchaser has not yet paid for the investment, and
so is vulnerable to a downturn in the market.
34 Mark-to-market may be defined as the process of recording the price or
value of an investment on a daily basis, in order to calculate profits and losses or to
confirm that percentage margin requirements are being met.
35 See generally Soci~t6 Italo-Belge v. Palm and Vegetable Oils Sdn. Bhd. (The
Post Chaser), [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 695.
36 See BRIDGE, supra note 10, paras. 5.36-37.
37 See generally Tradax Export S.A. v. Andrd & Cie. S.A., [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep.
484.
38 An example of this is the so-called circle clause that applies if the same
party appears more than once in the string brought about by the transmission of
notices of appropriation. Instead of that party performing in the character of
seller, only to receive performance as buyer at an interval later in the string, the
intervening contracts are circled out prior to the date of performance and the par-
ties to those contracts enter into bilateral settlements, treating their contracts
purely as market difference contracts. A standard circle clause will require all
[Vol. 15:55
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The strict approach of the general law is borne out by a few
examples that show a disinclination on the part of English
courts to question the motives behind the exercise of technical
rights of contractual termination. 39 To that extent, the case law
is hard to reconcile with general standards of good faith and fair
conduct of the sort espoused in the Restatement Second of Con-
tract 40 and in the UNIDROIT Principles of International Con-
tracts. 41 Also, it is not easy to reconcile such a strict approach
with the general tendency in English law to infuse rules of law
with substantial measures of judicial discretion, 42 a movement
that is also plainly evident in the United States. Therefore, it is
tempting to see international commodities sales law as distinc-
tive in character from remaining sales and contract law.
Extensive rights of termination are based on the principle
that important terms of the contract are promissory condi-
tions43 - an English usage that Samuel Williston rightly de-
plored 44 - such that any breach however slight gives rise to
termination rights. They are most likely to be seen in the
timely performance of obligations and in the tender of con-
forming documents under a CIF contract.45 So, in one case,
where the FOB buyer was four days late in giving the required
15 days' notice of readiness to load the ship, and the seller then
terminated the contract, the crystal clear question facing the
House of Lords was whether the seller had the right to do so,
even though, on the facts, the buyer's breach did not generate
parties to the succession of string contracts to cooperate with all other parties in
identifying the existence of a circle. See, e.g., GAFTA 100, supra note 23, at cl. 29.
"[aill Sellers and Buyers shall give every assistance to ascertain the circle and
when a circle shall have been ascertained in accordance with this clause same
shall be binding on all parties to the circle . . . ." Id.
39 See, e.g., Cargill UK Ltd. v. Continental UK Ltd., [1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 193,
affirmed [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 290; Richco International Ltd. v Bunge & Co Ltd.
(The "New Prosper"), [19911 2 Lloyd's Rep. 93.
40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
41 UNIDROIT Principles, art. 1.7.
42 See P.S. Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of
the Judicial Process and the Law, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1249, 1249-50 (1980).
43 The Sale of Goods Act 1979 exemplifies this approach. See Sale of Goods
Act 1979, §§ 11-15.
44 As the draftsman of the Uniform Sales Act 1906, he made sure that this
usage was not ported into the United States. The 1906 Act avoids this terminology.
45 See the failed attempt by the seller to contract out of this strict liability in
S.I.A.T. di Dal Ferro v. Tradax Overseas S.A., [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 53.
2003]
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serious factual consequences. 46 The court upheld the seller's
right of termination and was keen to lay emphasis upon the sys-
temic virtues of a law that laid down clearly the existence of
termination rights.47 The buyer and seller would know exactly
where they stood in the event of breach and would not be faced
with difficult issues of fact. They would not have to anticipate
how a court or arbitrator might handle the matter, perhaps
some years down the road and with the gift of hindsight.
Lengthy trials and difficult issues of damages assessment could
be avoided. Moreover, this strict approach in the commodities
market could not be criticized as unduly pro-buyer or pro-seller.
Traders in this market are both buyers and sellers, and indeed
will have both capacities in relation to a particular cargo in
string trading conditions. Clear-cut termination rights would
also assist in the handling by traders of their multiple contrac-
tual commitments. One might add, too, that, if it is well known
that a particular term of a standard form contract yields termi-
nation rights in all cases of breach, it reduces legal costs in a
commercial milieu where the presence of lawyers is confined to
a minimum. 48
In the case of documentary performance under a CIF con-
tract, deviations from the prescribed standard are not tolerated.
The buyer is not expected to buy into litigation and cannot be
called upon to accept documents that are commercially unsale-
able to sub-buyers or unacceptable to banks providing letter of
credit financing. This is the reason for the so-called clean docu-
ments rule. A famous English judge, in a case 49 where the bill of
lading did not evidence liability on the part of the designated
carrier for the whole of a voyage from a minor Norwegian port
to Yokohama via Hamburg, said that the buyer was entitled to
expect documents that were "fit to pass current in commerce."50
It would not matter that the goods have arrived at the dis-
46 See generally Bunge Corp. v. Tradax Export S.A., [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1.
47 See id.
48 Charterparty contracts and international sale agreements, even for large
quantities, are not entered into with legal assistance. When major law firms spe-
cialize in these areas, it is within their litigation departments.
49 See generally Hansson v. Hamel & Horley Ltd., [1922] 2 A.C. 36 (Lord
Sumner).
50 Id. at 46.
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charge port or have even been discharged in perfectly satisfac-
tory condition.51
Occasionally, a decision will be handed down that looks
quite shocking. One notorious example involves an FOB buyer
of a quantity of Australian barley required to nominate a ship
that could comply with all loading restrictions in all ports of the
States of Victoria and South Australia.52 The buyer nominated
a ship that the seller rejected because it could not enter all
ports. 53 Now, the seller had taken a short position in the mar-
ket, which had unexpectedly risen and was looking for a techni-
cal escape from the contract.54 When the buyer approached the
shipper (the Australian Barley Board) directly, and was told
that a cargo could be made available for the buyer's ship, the
seller remained unmoved and was vindicated in subsequent
proceedings. 55 FOB buyers conventionally choose the loading
port. The difficulty in the present case arose because the Aus-
tralian Barley Board was a monopoly exporter that wished to
retain the strategic freedom to choose the loading port.56 Con-
sequently, the choice of port was given to the seller in the pre-
sent contract. 57 The problem could have been dealt with by an
amendment to the usual standard form but this had not yet
happened. To the extent that the decision can be defended, it
has to be in terms of the compelling merits of certainty, the abil-
ity of powerful operators in the market to exercise their own
private sanctions in the face of egregious behavior, and the solu-
tion of problems of this kind by an amendment for the future of
the standard form.
If one takes stock of English sales law, it is useful to start
with the reasons that led some national governments to adopt
the CISG. They saw the CISG as an instrument superior to
their national sales laws for dealing with international sales
transactions. Whatever one may think about the United King-
dom's curious failure to adopt the CISG - which I shall return
51 See generally Orient Co. Ltd. v. Brekke & Howlid, [1913] 1 K.B. 531.
52 See generally Richco International Ltd. v. Bunge & Co. Ltd., (The "New
Prosper") [1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 93.
53 See id.
54 See id.
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 See id.
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to later - it would be difficult to criticize English sales law on
the ground of its unsuitability for handling international sales
transactions. This is because in some respects it functions as a
system that was designed for commodity sales, albeit sales that
were much smaller in scale than those we are accustomed to
seeing today. Furthermore, a number of statutory changes
since our law was first codified have been made so as not to
impinge upon the distinctive character of the commodity sales
regime. 58
The best example of English sales law as one designed for
commodity sales comes in the rules dealing with damages as-
sessment in the event of non-delivery by the seller (or non-ac-
ceptance by the buyer). In contrast with the rules in UCC
Article 2 and in the CISG, which base assessment upon cover
and resale transactions when these occur,5 9 English law stays
with a rule of damages assessment based upon the market pre-
vailing at the due date of delivery and in principle ignores such
transactions. 60 Suppose a seller fails to deliver on the agreed
date of July 1 and the buyer terminates the contract on July 4.
Apart from unusual cases, damages will be assessed according
to the market on July 1, regardless of whether it was reasonable
for the buyer to delay termination and regardless of the time it
might take a buyer to make a substitute purchase. Indeed, the
buyer is not required to enter into a substitute purchase at all
and can treat the contract as one for the payment of financial
differences. The approach to damages is an abstract one, based
on a notional or fictitious substitute transaction that could have
been entered into on the due date of performance, or on the
steps the buyer could have taken in advance to hedge the trans-
action so as to protect itself against the consequences of the
seller's breach.
58 See, e.g., Sale of Goods Act 1979, §15A (as added by the Sale and Supply of
Goods Act 1994), which, in introducing restrictions on the rights to reject goods
where a breach of condition has only slight consequences, does not apply these
restrictions to cases of late performance and documentary discrepancies, which are
the very areas in international sales where the assertion of technical rights is most
manifest.
59 See U.C.C. arts 2-706(1), 712(1); CISG art 75.
60 See Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc. v. MacLaine Watson & Co Ltd. (No. 2),
[19901 3 All ER 723, 730.
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The need to make separate provision for commodity sales
despite changes in English sales law, influenced at least in part
by the consumerist movement, is evidenced by the limitations
placed upon a recent statutory incursion into the buyer's right
to terminate for breach of a promissory condition. 61 In the case
of conditions that concern the description, quality and fitness of
goods, termination by the buyer in a commercial sale is now dis-
allowed if the breach is so slight that it would be unreasonable
to terminate. For the most part, matters of description, fitness,
and quality are dealt with in commodity sales so that the buyer
is bound to take the goods anyway but with a price rebate. The
statutory reform stops short, however, of dealing with time and
documentary obligations, which are precisely those obligations
where decisions to terminate are made for strategic or opportu-
nistic reasons. Commodity sales are thus ring-fenced from stat-
utory change.
A consideration of the CISG reveals a contractual philoso-
phy that is at odds with the commodity sales world I have por-
trayed. The avoidance of contracts for fundamental breach - a
test both demanding and indeterminate - is a world away from
opportunistic termination for breach of a promissory condition.
The entitlement of sellers to cure defective performance exhib-
its a philosophy of contractual continuance as well as the avoid-
ance of waste that might otherwise be caused by easily acquired
rights of avoidance. There is, admittedly, an entitlement to
serve notices on a defaulting party, making time of the essence
of the contract, but this is far from the hair trigger rights of
termination for late delivery in a commodity sale governed by
English law. The instruction to tribunals to interpret the rules
of the CISG in accordance with good faith contains latent scope
for locking the parties even further into the contract. There is
also displayed, in the rules concerning the incidence of risk, an
almost total lack of understanding of the realities of bulk ship-
ment and marine insurance.
In light of these considerations, it is no small wonder that
every commodities sales form and oil company's standard terms
that I have seen expressly excludes the operation of the CISG,
which the CISG on its own terms permits contracting parties to
61 See Sale of Goods Act 1979, §15A.
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do. From the point of view of commodities traders, additional
virtues of the existing English system include the certainty, the
system and the consistency that over a century of experience
provides. One of the drawbacks of any new law is the uncer-
tainty of its application and its tendency to feed litigation.
There is no reason to suppose that commodities traders do not
know what they really want and that, if they gave the CISG
time to bed down, they would appreciate its merits in due time.
That would be arrogant and unjustifiable.
A part of the success of the CISG lies in its adoption by (at
the last count) sixty-three States. The CISG has also been
transposed into Norwegian law as part of a fused instrument
applicable to both domestic and international sales. 62 Adopting
States include the major trading nations with the exception of
Japan and the United Kingdom. The attitude of the United
Kingdom is difficult to explain. The country took a leading role
in the development of the CISG, and in its predecessor, the Uni-
form Law on International Sales (ULIS).63 The CISG does not
adversely affect the interests of commodity traders, since they
are permitted to exclude it and have done so for a number of
years. 64 To that extent, the CISG poses no threat to the provi-
sion of legal services in the City of London as parties opt for ICC
arbitration in Paris instead. There is no reason to suppose that
English law is any better than the CISG in handling those in-
ternational sales that do not concern commodities. My own
view, based on a close comparison of the two bodies of law, is
that the CISG would better suit the small-scale importer or ex-
porter, or the buyer and seller of manufactured goods.
62 See Norwegian Sale of Goods Act 1988, § 5(1) and ch. XV, available at http:/
/www.jus.uio.no/lm/norway.sog.act. 1988/doc.html.
63 Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on International Sale of Goods, July
1, 1964, available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/c-ulis.htm [her-
inafter ULIS]. The ULIS was incorporated in English law by the Uniform Laws on
International Sales Act 1967.
64 The following example is to be found in GAFTA 100, supra note 23, at cl. 33:
"International Conventions[:1 The following shall not apply to this contract: - (a)
the Uniform Law on Sales and the Uniform Law on Formation to which effect is
given by the Uniform Laws on International Sales Act 1967; (b) the United Na-
tions Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods of 1980; and (c)
the United Nations Convention on Prescription (Limitation) in the International
Sale of Goods of 1974 and the amending Protocol of 1980."
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Like so many other aspects of law reform in England, it
comes down to priorities in the matter of legislative time and a
lack of political will. To depart for the moment from sales law,
there is some reason to suppose that current support by the De-
partment of Trade and Industry for a radical reform of the law
of company charges, along the lines of the Article 9 system of
notice filing, is inspired by fears that the current law may of-
fend that part of the European Convention on Human Rights
dealing with the protection of property rights. 65 It is hard for a
rational lawyer to see anything in this, but it is indicative of the
sorts of capricious currents and movements that tip the balance
in governmental decision-making. A story is told of an un-
named senior civil servant that, if exporters and importers were
to stage a demonstration in Whitehall in favor of the CISG, the
government would take the matter seriously. That conjures up
strange visions of chanting demonstrators - "What do we
want? We want the CISG. When do we want it? We want it
now."
What the government, of course, does not recognize is that
United Kingdom merchants are already exposed to the CISG for
reasons I shall bring out in a moment. What the government
might fail to appreciate is that elements of the CISG are al-
ready being inserted into the fabric of English sales law indi-
rectly by way of European directives dealing with consumer
sales law.66 What government might fail to foresee is that the
recent announcement by the European Commission of a Com-
munication on European Contract Law, 67 one of whose possible
outcomes is a Pan-European contract code, may lead to a body
of law inspired by the CISG supplanting altogether English con-
tract and sales law. If this were to happen, commodity traders
would not have a sort of "legacy English law" to turn to when
65 This concern has emerged in the consultation process.
66 The EC Directive 1999/441EC on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer
Goods and Associated Guarantees contains provisions "requiring" certain acts by
the seller, and provisions on price reduction that are features of civilian systems
and also found in the CISG. See Article 3 of the EC Directive, available at http:fl
www.dti.gov.uk/cacp/ca/constitutionsle-ofgoods.htm.
67 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament on European Contract Law, Doc No 10996/01(July 2001), available at
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200lO2/dselect/deucom/72
/7202.htm.
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selecting a governing law via the choice of law process. 68 En-
glish law would cease to exist.
II. THE CISG AND UNIFORM LAW
Commodities traders whose contracts are governed by English
law have opted for a system of sales law resting upon a bedrock
of private law. English sales law, in the same way as Article 2
of the UCC, permits an easy reference to this body of law at the
outer limits of sales law.69 This process of course is not availa-
ble in the case of international uniform law, especially when the
process begins with the special law of sale rather than the gen-
eral law of contract. It is tempting to imagine the CISG as an
autarkic body of uniform law, floating free in some sort of inter-
national ether. I shall attempt later to dispel this vision,
though it has to be confessed that the CISG is less "rooted" than
Article 2.70 Before dealing with the efforts of lawyers and tribu-
nals to deal with the relative rootlessness of the CISG, we
should explore its development and its principal features.
The 1980 Diplomatic Conference in Vienna that produced the
CISG was the outcome of twelve years of preparation, which
took as the starting point the previous failed Hague Conven-
tions of 1964 on sales formation (ULF) and sales substantive
law (ULIS). These in turn were the outcome of efforts, inter-
rupted by the Second World War that stemmed from the pio-
neering work of the great German jurist, Rabel. 71 The Hague
Conventions failed - not because of internal deficiencies,
though there were some - but because of a lack of involvement
on the part of the developing world, the socialist economies of
eastern Europe, and the United States. It is an exercise in futil-
68 The better view is that the Rome Convention, implemented in English law
by the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990, ch. 36, permits the application of only
a living system of law. By that account, a choice of Roman law by the parties
would be unacceptable. The Rome Convention and the Contracts (Applicable Law)
Act 1990, ch. 36 are both available at http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/
acts1990/Ukpga19900036_en 1.htm#end.
69 See Sale of Goods Act 1979, § 62(2) (permits supplementary references to
the rules of the common law so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions
of the Act).
70 See, e.g., U.C.C. art. 1-103 (which permits a reference to supplementary
principles of law and equity).
71 See PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 1980 (CISG) 1 (1998).
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ity to sell uniform law to a non-participating world. States
must be active participants in the uniformity process, delegates
must absorb the spirit of collegiality, and States and their dele-
gates must feel a sense of ownership of the product. All of these
requirements were met in full by the CISG.72
There are broadly two ways in which a uniform sales in-
strument might be seen to have an autarkic character. First,
its application might depend upon criteria that do not involve a
reference to the forum State's rules of private international law.
Secondly, its provisions might be self-contained and involve no
reference to any other body of law playing a supplementary
role. It is my contention that, in both of these respects, the
CISG lacks the character of an autarkic instrument.
Taking first the circumstances in which the CISG applies,
these were settled only during the committee proceedings held
during the Diplomatic Conference in 1980 and as a result of
combining proposed Italian and Bulgarian amendments. 73 The
ULIS had based its own application on the cross-border disper-
sal of contract formation or contract performance. 74 In conse-
quence, this so-called "universalist" law could be applied
regardless of the residence or nationality of the parties. It
might even be applied if the parties had selected a particular
governing law, were it not for the parties being free in whole or
in part to opt out of ULIS, 75 as indeed they are free to do under
the CISG.76 ULIS could therefore apply "accidentally" by virtue
of a matter being litigated in the courts of a Contracting State
and to the surprise of the contracting parties. A further charac-
teristic of ULIS was its rigorous eschewal of private interna-
tional law for the purposes of its own application. 77
72 Representatives of sixty-two states and eight international organizations
assembled in Vienna in 1980 on the occasion of the diplomatic conference.
73 The various proceedings leading up to the signing of the CISG are to be
found in JOHN HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTER-
NATIONAL SALEs 476, 679 (1989). They were compiled from the relevant volumes of
the UNCITRAL Yearbooks and the Official Records of the 1980 Diplomatic Confer-
ence in Vienna. The proceedings are also available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.
edulcisg/conference.html.
74 See ULIS art. 1(1).
75 See ULIS art. 3.
76 See CISG art. 6.
77 See ULIS art. 2.
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In contrast with ULIS, the CISG applies without any refer-
ence to cross-border formation or performance. The parties
must either be resident in different Contracting States (route
1);78 or else they must be resident in different States with the
rules of private international law leading to the law of a Con-
tracting State (route 2). 79 It is under route 2 that parties before
an English court might find themselves "bound" in their con-
tractual dealings by the CISG. This might occur, not as a mat-
ter of treaty obligation but pursuant to the normal choice of law
process in an English court, as where English choice of law
rules lead to the law of a State whose courts would apply the
CISG under route 1.80 The rules of private international law
referred to in route 2 can only be those of the forum State and
the CISG itself. The rules, when applicable by this second
route, would seem to be part of the law of the Contracting State,
to the extent of its supplanting that State's domestic law of sale
and its private international law rules. An alternative view,
which has some attractions, would treat the forum State's duty
to apply the CISG as supplanting the forum State's choice of
law process, so that the CISG is applied as part of the lex fori.
Be that as it may, a few States, including the United States,
have made a declaration 8l that they will not apply the CISG
78 See CISG art. 1(1)(a).
79 See id. art. 1(1)(b).
80 Suppose that English choice of law rules, taken from the Rome Convention,
lead to French law in a case where the seller is resident in France and the buyer in
Germany. France and Germany have both adopted the CISG. The question that
arises is, What do we mean by "French law"? The Rome Convention forbids re-
course to the doctrine of renvoi (art. 15) but, it is submitted, the application of the
CISG as French law would not involve renvoi. The reason is that the CISG has
been absorbed within French law, where it operates to deal with international
sales contracts as defined by the CISG, where it works in parallel with the rules of
the Code civil, which apply only to all other sales contracts. The CISG in French
law therefore supersedes such French domestic law and private international rules
as had previously occupied the same space. Suppose, however, that the English
court's choice of law rules lead it to French law in a case where the seller is French
but the buyer is resident in Portugal (Portugal not being a Contracting State).
Suppose further that the French courts would also apply French law as the appli-
cable law of the sales contract (this should be the case since France is a party to
the Rome Convention). If the English courts then applied the CISG, on the ground
that a French court in those circumstances would apply the CISG (pursuant to
route 2 as opposed to route 1), it is submitted that the English courts would be
invoking the doctrine of renvoi in a way that offends Article 15 of the Rome
Convention.
81 As they are permitted to do by Article 95 of the CISG.
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where it can only be applied by way of route 2.82 This declara-
tion apart, private international law plays a considerable part -
though a diminishing part with the increasing adherence of
Contracting States - in the application of the CISG.
The second way in which an instrument like the CISG
might be autarkic concerns its relationship to other bodies of
rules or legal systems. This matter breaks down into two parts.
The more obvious concerns the body of private law, including
contract, on which the CISG "sits." Less obvious is the body of
law that might be drawn upon to fill gaps in the sales provisions
of the uniform instrument. Unlike, say, the UK Sale of Goods
Act 1979,83 the CISG cannot draw upon a pre-codification body
of case law to fill gaps, though the presence of gaps obviously
diminishes over time with the build-up of reported cases and
arbitral decisions. Akin to the filling of gaps is the process of
interpreting the CISG,8 4 which lacks the sort of legal culture
that absorbs new legislation in domestic systems. It is instruc-
tive to look first at the processes of interpretation and gap-fill-
ing, starting first with interpretation.
There is of course no international commercial court
charged with the settlement of private parties' disputes under
uniform law and no realistic possibility of such a court being
created. UNCITRAL does not provide a supra-national judicial
authority to which national courts are by treaty-bound to defer.
For the international community at large, there is nothing cor-
responding to the role played by the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) in matters of uniform law within the European Union. 5
It is worth noting, however, the range of possibilities be-
tween the binding decisions of a supranational court and unfet-
tered interpretation by national courts and arbitral tribunals.
Let us take as an example the Brussels on Jurisdiction and En-
forcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
82 The other States are China, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Germany
has declared that it will respect the Article 95 declarations of these States.
83 See generally Sale of Goods Act 1979.
84 The filling of gaps is dealt with by Article 7(2) of the CISG and interpreta-
tion by Article 7(1).
85 See, e.g., Treaty on European Union art. 234, 1992 O.J. (C 191) (regarding
the reference procedure).
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1968.86 As the 1971 Protocol to the Convention makes plain,
and as implementing UK legislation (the Civil Jurisdiction and
Judgments Act 1982) confirms, questions of interpretation may,
like any other matter of European Community law, be referred
directly by the national court to the ECJ under the now familiar
procedure.8 7 In addition, there is a requirement that such ques-
tions be determined by national courts according to principles
laid down in relevant decisions of the ECJ.88 Furthermore, ju-
dicial notice must be taken of relevant decisions or even expres-
sions of opinions by the ECJ.89 The same system has been
created for choice of law under the Rome Convention on the
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations,90 though it has not
yet come into force.
The Lugano Convention 198891 extended the scheme of the
Brussels Convention to European Free Trade Association
(EFTA) States minus the paramount position of the ECJ. In
Protocol No. 2 to the Lugano Convention, there is no treaty obli-
gation to defer to the case law of the ECJ, still less to refer ques-
tions of interpretation to it.92 But there is an obligation on
national courts to "pay due account to the principles laid down
by any relevant provision delivered by courts of the other Con-
tracting States."93 In addition, there is a treaty obligation to
deliver details of certain judgments to a central body for the
purpose of classification by that body and dissemination of the
information to national authorities and to the European Com-
mission.94 The judgments in question include decisions of the
ECJ and of national courts of last instance as well as final judg-
ments of particular importance.
86 EC Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, Brussels 1968, available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/ec.
jurisdiction.enforcement.judgements.civil.commercial.matters.convention.brus-
sels.1968/doc.html.
87 See Treaty on European Union, art. 234.
88 See Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, § 3(1).
89 See id. § 3(2).
90 See, e.g., Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990, §§ 1 and 3 and the Brussels
Protocol 1988.
91 It is scheduled to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 by a later
amendment. See Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, Schedule 3C.
92 See Lugano Convention 1988, Protocol no.2, available at http://www.ius.no/
lm/ec.efta.jurisdiction.enforcement.judgments.
93 Lugano Convention 1988, Protocol no.2, art. 1.
94 See Lugano Convention 1988, Protocol no.2, art. 2.
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The Lugano approach cannot guarantee the same uniform-
ity of interpretation by national courts as that provided under
the Brussels Convention. It does, however, go somewhat be-
yond typical international uniform legislation. Taking the
CISG as an example, there is nothing corresponding to the
Lugano Protocol no. 2. But outside the CISG itself, UNCITRAL
deals with national correspondents who send in details of signif-
icant national decisions. These are published in an abbreviated
and cross-referenced form and published under the label of
CLOUT (Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts). So far, the service
has focused mainly on the CISG with some additional cases on
the Model Arbitration Law and the Hamburg Rules 1978 (deal-
ing with carriers' liability). It is available on the internet 95 and
is a most useful service, but it is a long way from the compulsion
that promotes the uniform interpretation of the Brussels Con-
vention in EU courts. It is, however, better than nothing. More
useful still is the exercise, in which Queen Mary College of
London University and Pace University Law School play a
prominent role, namely, the translation of the full reports of
cases and arbitral tribunals into English, which has become the
lingua franca of the uniform law movement.9 6 Nevertheless,
until certain national courts assume a responsibility for intro-
ducing rhetorical persuasion and pedagogy into their decisions,
those decisions may, like poor wine, travel badly across national
frontiers.9 7 Moreover, to date, there has been a noticeable un-
willingness for national courts to cite decisions on the CISG
handed down by courts and tribunals in other countries. This
all adds up to a failure to come to terms with the obligation of
courts in Article 7(1) of the CISG: "In the interpretation of this
Convention, regard shall be had to its international character
and to the need to promote uniformity in its application . .. ."
The impact of the recent work done by the translation service
has yet to be felt but there is cause to hope that it will have a
significant effect over time.
It is not only case law that has a part to play in the uniform
international interpretation of the CISG. Academic literature
95 See http://www.uncitral.org.
96 See http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu.
97 See generally C Witz, Droit uniforme de la vente internationale des mar-
chandises D.1998.Somm.307.
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may not amount to a formal source of law, and indeed is not
referred to explicitly in Article 7(1), but it is certainly influen-
tial and will continue to be so. The literature on the CISG is
already voluminous - the number of books must run to dozens
by now and there are many hundreds of articles on the sub-
ject.98 The cause of the international uniform integrity of the
CISG has been taken up in a major way in the academic litera-
ture. Academic writings have a part to play in building up the
legal culture surrounding the CISG if only because academics
have more time to reflect than practitioners engaged in the rush
of litigation. Academic lawyers therefore have a particular re-
sponsibility to promote the uniform application of the CISG.
It is immensely difficult to coin international uniform law
that is free from national bias. Indeed, since the process of uni-
formity often entails selecting the best from a range of compet-
ing ideas and solutions - new legal ideas are very rare - it is
impossible to efface national experience. The skill lies in being
able to stand outside one's national legal culture when applying
the CISG. The architects of the CISG were keen to emancipate
it as far as they could from national legal culture. One method
was to invent new terminology. For example, one of the key
concepts of a sales law - delivery - is deliberately downplayed
in the CISG, giving way at certain points to the inelegant ex-
pression "hand over."99 (A difficulty that cropped up with the
CISG's predecessor - ULIS - concerned the domestic connota-
tions in French law of the translation of "delivery," namely "d-
livrance.") But judges are only human. A review of German
cases, dealing with the requirement in Article 39 that a buyer
give notice to the seller of any defect in the goods, shows that
the German judiciary has imported from German domestic law
the strict attributes of notice. 100 Again, the concept of fitness for
purpose lies at the heart of Article 35, which deals with the
quality of the goods that the seller is bound to supply. There is
a danger that English judges, who have a very extensive experi-
98 See the extensive list at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu.
99 See the way that the language of the CISG shifts between the two in Arti-
cles 30-34.
100 The Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT) service now, helpfully, gath-
ers cases according to both country and the particular Article that is the subject of
the litigation.
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ence of the concept (going back to at least 1829), 1 would, if the
UK adopted the Convention, simply apply that experience with-
out considering the Convention as a whole and the role that fit-
ness for purpose plays in it. Similarly, Article 35 requires the
seller to supply goods of the contractual description. One hopes
that English courts would not be beguiled by the technicalities
of description in English law and would recognize its distorted
character in English law as founded upon an idiosyncratic na-
tional experience. 10 2
Article 7(1) of the CISG goes on to require courts and tribu-
nals when interpreting the CISG to have regard to the obser-
vance of good faith in international trade. Like Sherlock
Holmes' dog that did not bark in the night,10 3 this provision is
above all noteworthy for what it does not say. It does not im-
pose a general duty of good faith and fair dealing in the forma-
tion and performance of contracts, which was objected to by
some representatives in the course of the 1980 Vienna Diplo-
matic Conference.' 0 4 Rather, it is a compromise between the
rejectionists and those who wanted to see some mention of good
faith in the Convention. How any court is meant to read this
provision is a mystery. It might be argued that there is no dif-
ference between a duty of good faith resting on the parties and a
rule that their rights and duties should be interpreted accord-
ing to the standard of good faith. According to this proposition,
parties derive their contractual rights and duties ultimately
from the Convention so that, if the Convention has to be inter-
preted in accordance with good faith, this means that the par-
ties' rights and duties take their character from this good faith
interpretation of the Convention. 10 5
101 See generally Jones v. Bright, [1829] 5 Bing 533. See generally MICHAEL G.
BRIDGE, THE SALE OF GOODS ch. 7 (1997).
102 See generally BRIDGE, supra note 11, at ch. 7.
103 See generally Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, at http://www.obtuse.
conjuniper-docs/misc/silverblaze.html.
104 See, e.g., the Summary Records of the Meetings of the First Committee (5th
meeting, Mar. 13, 1980), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu.
105 Schlechtriem asserts that art. 7(1) is not confined to the interpretation of
the CISG's express rules. See SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 71, at 63. This may seem
a debatable proposition, but note the way the Convention lays duties on the parties
to abide by the terms of the contract (see, among other provisions, Articles 30 and
53), thus incorporating those contractual duties by reference into the Convention.
Taking now the case of a right expressly laid down by the Convention, a seller has
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It is predictable that some national courts will interpret
this provision, which raises difficult issues of interpretation,
more expansively than others. Nevertheless, given that an ex-
plicit standard of good faith and fair dealing was rejected by the
conference delegates, does this mean that the standard itself
was rejected as a general principle or only that express mention
of the standard was rejected? It may be possible to bring good
faith into the CISG by means of the gap-filling provision in Arti-
cle 7(2) as a general principle upon with the Convention is
based. 106
Perhaps the most difficult matter arising out of the incorpo-
ration of uniform law in a national system of law is knowing
how to fill out the gaps in its provisions. In the case of national
legislation, there is a developed tradition of case law, doctrinal
writing, similar legislation, and shared understandings to
which resort can be had. But uniform law has no hinterland.
What is a court to do when filling gaps? The danger is that the
uniform law will be overwhelmed by national culture in na-
tional courts. 107 It is for this reason that uniform laws contain
interpretation rules, which are amongst the most important of
their provisions. According to Article 7(2) of the CISG:
Questions cdncerning matters governed by this Convention which
are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with
the general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of
such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of
the rules of private international law.
In a common law system like English law, courts have not
always been too concerned to clarify whether they are working
within the text of a statute like the Sale of Goods Act or within
a right to make time of the essence of the contract so that the buyer's failure to pay
within the reasonable time spelt out in the seller's notice entitles the seller to
avoid the contract even in the absence of a fundamental breach of contract (see
Articles 63 and 64(1)(b)). Suppose now that the seller's motive is to escape from a
contract that has now become disadvantageous because of a rising market. What
does it mean to say that Articles 63 and 64(1)(b) are to be interpreted in accor-
dance with good faith? That the seller's exercise of its Convention right to make
time of the essence should not be corrupted by an impure motive?
106 See SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 71, at 65.
107 If such were to happen, then fresh impetus would be given to the choice of
law process as there might arise a choice between different national "brands" of
the same uniform law.
[Vol. 15:55
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol15/iss1/2
BLAINE SLONE LECTURE
the body of uncodified common law.' 08 Such a lack of concern is
impossible in the case of the CISG. There is no authoritative
international commercial common law, despite attempts by ju-
rists to conjure up a new lex mercatoria. Moreover, the compar-
ative brevity of the time scale leading to the diplomatic
conference at which the Convention was signed dictated a num-
ber of omissions from the text of the final act. The CISG ex-
cludes issues of contractual validity' 0 9 and there are gaps in its
coverage of certain issues. For example, it deals fully with is-
sues of damages" o but does not specifically mention penalty
and liquidated damages clauses. It permits the award of inter-
est on late payment"' but gives no practical guidance on its
calculation.112 It deals with fundamental breach"13 but in less
detail than one might have wanted. 1 4
The reference in Article 7(2) to the general principles on
which the CISG is based has a stronger resonance for civil law-
yers than for common lawyers. In the case of a comprehensive
code, the answer to problems will always be found within the
code even if no text explicitly speaks to the problem. Common
lawyers, whilst conceding that statutes are supreme as a source
of law, nevertheless still regard them as in derogation from the
common law, which in principle is comprehensive, and so inter-
pret them in a restrictive way." 15
To find the general principles in a code requires its various
provisions to be subjected to an inductive process that sees
them as examples of a more general principle. It is a creative
and necessarily subjective process. This general principle can
then be applied to deal with the novel case not explicitly dealt
108 This is because there will be a statutory outlet to compatible common law
which, in any case, will often be forged along the same lines as the statutory text:
see section 62(2) of the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979 and Young; Marten Ltd. v.
McManus Childs Ltd., [1969] 1 A.C. 454.
109 See CISG art. 4(a).
110 See CISG arts. 74-77.
111 See CISG art. 78.
112 It does not mention the rate or the starting date or whether it is simple or
compound.
113 See CISG art. 25.
114 Consider the added detail in the UNIDROIT Principles, art. 7.3.1 (funda-
mental non-performance).
115 For a particularly strong version of this, see Minet v. Leman, [1855] 20
Beav. 269, 278 (Romilly MR), cited in National Assistance Board v. Wilkinson,
[1952] 2 Q.B. 648, 659.
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with in the code. The very subjectivity of this process lends it-
self to dissonance and to the compromising of that uniformity,
which is expressed in the CISG. Nevertheless, it is preferable
to the alternative, which almost as a counsel of despair invokes
the governing law found by means of the choice of law process to
deal with sales matters that are not expressly resolved in the
CISG.116 If courts and tribunals are to be criticized for their
accomplishments to date, it is above all on the ground that they
have been too willing to invoke private international law117 and
insufficiently creative in discovering general principles in the
text of the CISG.
In Article 7(2), there is of course no reference to the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts.
Work on them did not start until the conclusion of the 1980 Dip-
lomatic Conference that produced the CISG. The UNIDROIT
Principles have the great merit that they can assist in cor-
recting one of the major deficiencies of the CISG, that it can be
changed only through the medium of a diplomatic conference
and has no equivalent to the constant editorial work provided
for the American Uniform Commercial Code. The UNIDROIT
Principles are capable of editorial alteration from time to time
because, to the extent that they serve as a contract law, they
are only a model law. Moreover, they serve other purposes as
well. The format of the Principles is akin to that of the Uniform
Commercial Code, with hypothetical illustrations and comment
attached to each article, which for many represents the pre-
ferred medium for international or regional uniformity, supe-
rior to the restricted and enclosed world of the code. A reference
to the Principles can be a useful guide in the search for imma-
nent general principles in the CISG, so long as the Principles do
not conflict with the provisions of the CISG. The Principles
might also be invoked to assist in the international interpreta-
tion of the CISG under Article 7(1).
It is to repair the deficiency of an underlying common law
that the UNIDROIT Principles could prove most useful. But a
difficult issue concerns the legitimacy of these Principles under
the CISG, since they were adopted by a rigorous process that
116 See CISG art. 7(2).
117 This is particularly evident in the case of judgments and awards applying
Article 78 (see cases cited in the CLOUT service).
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looked to the merits rather than the cross-border popularity of
individual rules.118 This prevents them from being applied in
their totality as usage under Article 9(2); indeed, some rules,
such as those dealing with methods of payment, 119 are more
suitably treated as matters of usage than others, such as those
dealing with the definition of fundamental non-performance.
The system of qualitative choice that went into the drafting of
the Principles makes it impossible to see them as extant but
uncodified at the time the CISG was concluded and so forming
the basis of the CISG. They are nevertheless useful as comple-
ments to the CISG, and nice points of legitimacy and chronology
are unlikely to stand in their way if it is expedient for a court or
arbitrator to invoke them. 120 The UNIDROIT Principles were
not expressly designed to be incorporated as legislation in na-
tional legal systems. Rather, they were designed to assist arbi-
trators and courts empowered or competent to settle disputes ex
aequo et bono or in accordance with general principles, the lex
mercatoria or some other formula of this type.
12
'
This leads on to the question whether astute contracting
parties might select them as the governing contract law to sup-
plement the CISG in those cases where the CISG is applicable.
(The same question arises in' connection with the CISG itself in
those cases where it would not be applicable according to its
own terms.) This is very much a matter for national legal sys-
tems. Taking English law as an example, it is plain that such
clauses are permissible in arbitration agreements. Under our
Arbitration Act 1996, an arbitrator may decide a dispute either
"in accordance with the law chosen by the parties as applicable
to the substance of the dispute" or (emphasis added) "in accor-
dance with such other considerations as are agreed by them or
determined by the tribunal."122 In one pre-1996 case, a senior
118 See Introduction by the UNIDROIT Governing Council to the published
version, Principles of International Commercial Contracts (Rome 1994), vii: "Since
. . . the Principles are intended to provide a system of rules especially tailored to
the needs of international commercial transactions, they ... embody what are per-
ceived to be the best solutions, even if still not generally adopted."
119 See UNIDROIT Principles, arts 6.1.7 - 10.
120 For example, they have been cited in the following CISG cases: ICC Arbi-
trations Cases No 9117 (March 1998) and 9333 (October 1998); Austrian Arbitral
Tribunal SCH-4318(Vienna) (15 June 1994).
121 See UNIDROIT Principles, pmbl.
122 Arbitration Act 1996 §46(1).
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judge, Donaldson MR, upheld an arbitral award conducted on
the basis of "internationally accepted principles of law gov-
erning contractual relations."123 The arbitration had been con-
ducted according to the ICC Rules, which in Article 13(3) enable
parties to "determine the law to be applied by the arbitrator."' 24
In the absence of such choice, the arbitrator was to "apply the
law ... by the rule of conflict which he deems appropriate." 125
This reasoning should support the applicability of the
UNIDROIT Principles as the chosen applicable law of the
contract.
Where there is no arbitration agreement, the position is not
so clear. The Rome Convention 1980, which does not apply to
arbitration agreements, 26 allows the parties to choose "the
law" to govern the contract 127 and goes on to refer to the parties
having chosen "a foreign law."' 28 It then makes provision for
the law that is applicable in the absence of such choice.' 29 Must
it be a territorially-based law that is chosen? One argument is
that, if the Arbitration Act had to spell out the possibility of a
non-territorial system, the absence of a similar formula from
the Rome Convention is fatal. The Inter-American Convention
of 1994 (Mexico City) has a provision similar to Article 3.1 of
Rome' 30 but also calls for the application of customs of interna-
tional law in accordance with the dictates of justice. 13' This
formula could open the door to a sympathetic court to apply a
123 Deutsche Schachtbau v. Ras Al Khaimah National Oil Co., [19871 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 246, 251.
124 I.C.C. Rule 13(3).
125 Id.
126 Rome Convention, art. 1.2(d).
127 Rome Convention, art.3.1: "A contract shall be governed by the law chosen
by the parties. The choice must be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable
certainty by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case. By their
choice the parties can select the law applicable to the whole or a part only of the
contract."
128 Id. art. 3.3.
129 See id. art. 4.
130 Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Con-
tracts, art. 7: "The contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties.
The parties' agreement on this selection must be express or, in the event that there
is no express agreement, must be evident from the parties' behavior and from the
clauses of the contract, considered as a whole. Said selection may relate to the
entire contract or to a part of same."
131 Id. art. 10: "In addition to the provisions in the foregoing articles, the
guidelines, customs, and principles of international commercial law as well as com-
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non-national body of law like the UNIDROIT Principles. As for
English case law, one very senior English judge, Lord Diplock,
whilst not explicitly rejecting a chosen non-territorial law, was
insistent that the parties' freedom of choice extended to systems
of law. 132 That would prevent the application of the UNIDROIT
Principles, and the CISG itself, solely because the parties have
selected them as the governing law of the contract. Yet, the ex-
press incorporation of such an instrument by the contracting
parties might be treated as the shorthand incorporation of their
individual rules into the text of the contract, 133 in which case
the difficulty concerning their status largely falls away.
I now come back to the remaining aspect of autarky and the
CISG, which concerns the body of private law - contract, tort,
and property - on which the CISG sits. Taking contract first,
we have seen that the UNIDROIT Principles might be invoked
to fill gaps in the coverage of the CISG. It is, however, rather
difficult to define what is a gap. First of all, it may be flagged
up by the CISG itself, as occurs with the barebones statement of
an entitlement to interest in Article 78, without any guidance
as to the type, rate or starting-date of interest. More difficult is
the silent gap, the identification of which depends upon where
one draws the line between the general law of contract and the
special law of sale. Do penalty clauses belong to contract law or
to sale? Opinions might well differ. I should not have classified
interest as a matter of sale, since my domestic bias tells me that
it falls under the head of civil procedure. Closer attention to the
matter, however, persuades me .that interest may be seen as
compensation for being kept out of one's money,134 in which
mercial usage and practices generally accepted shall apply in order to discharge
the requirements of justice and equity in the particular case."
132 See Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. v. Kuwait Insurance Co., [1984] A.C. 50,
60, 65.
133 Since so much of the contract law of a given country is dispositive, it should
follow that the selection of the UNIDROIT Principles as governing law could be
seen, on a rule-by-rule basis, as displacing inconsistent rules of the otherwise ap-
plicable law.
134 This assumes that I am demanding interest not in the capacity as a credi-
tor, but as someone who has suffered loss arising out of the non-payment of money.
That loss, compensable in interest damages, may take the form of interest that I
have to pay a creditor for the loan advance taken in substitution for the money I
should have been paid, or it may be the interest I could have earned by advancing
moneys received to a borrower.
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case it is entirely understandable that it should fall within Arti-
cle 78 of the CISG.
In the case of penalty clauses, there is the added difficulty
that some legal systems may regard them as a matter of con-
tractual validity (though the UNIDROIT Principles do not),135
and therefore the subject of the validity "carve out" in Article 4
of the CISG. What price uniformity in cases of this sort? If
forced to generalize in the interest of uniformity, and taking ac-
count of the exclusion of property matters from the CISG,136 I
should say that, apart from validity, special contract should be
treated as at least co-extensive with general contract but ex-
pressed in the particular context of sale. To a large extent, this
would compensate for the absence of an international uniform
law of general contract.
When a Contracting State "beds down" the CISG in its legal
system, this gives rise to possible distortions created by incom-
patible elements. I shall take two examples to illustrate the
point. My first concerns a rule present in some common law
systems that, in the event of a misrepresentation inducing the
contract, the victim is entitled to rescind the contract ab initio if
the misrepresentation, at least in part, induces entry into the
contract. 37 Rescission is not technically contractual termina-
tion, or avoidance under the CISG, but like them, it is an escape
from the contract. It is much more readily available than avoid-
ance for fundamental breach. Since many breaches of contract
can also be viewed as inducing misrepresentations,138 a com-
mon law system that suffers its misrepresentation rules to ap-
ply unchecked in international sales governed by the CISG
undermines the remedies structure of the CISG and challenges
the CISG's essential value of contractual continuance. Now, a
common law court might say that misrepresentation, which sits
alongside mistake, is a matter of contractual validity standing
outside the CISG. I believe that would be a mistake. In the
cause of the internationally uniform application of the CISG
under Article 7(1), a common law court should interpret validity
135 It deals with Penalties in Article 7.4.13, contained in Chapter 7 ("Non-Per-
formance") and not in Chapter 3 ("Validity").
136 CISG art. 4(b).
137 See generally Redgrave v. Hurd, [1881] 20 Ch. D. 1.
138 In English law, see § 1(a) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967. See generally
Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Mardon, [1976] Q.B. 801.
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in a way that is consistent with the integrity of the CISG, and
should treat inducing misrepresentation as a gap in the cover-
age of the CISG to be dealt with by a general principle of con-
tractual continuance that would place limits upon rescission
akin to the limits on avoidance.
A discordant body of tort law presents a different challenge
since we are not dealing with gaps in the CISG. Suppose goods
are sold and contain a hidden fault that gives rise to extensive
consequential loss, consequential damages may be recovered
under the CISG 139 and the seller's liability should be treated as
strict 140 and as not falling within the exemption provision of the
CISG.141 Suppose, however, that the applicable tort law classi-
fies a seller's strict liability for defective goods causing damage
as a matter of tort and gives producers the benefit of immunity
from liability in tort if they are able to invoke a state of the art
defense. The question is, how should we deal with this conflict?
Does the answer depend upon whether the applicable law treats
the matter as sounding exclusively in tort or permits a defense
to strict tortious liability only where the seller sues in tort? It is
enough to note the problem without trying at this stage to re-
solve it. The extension of the CISG damages rules to physical
proprietary loss has been regretted by some, on the ground that
it gives rise to conflict with domestic tort law. Be that as it
may, there is no reason why the scope of the CISG in a legal
system should be determined by the scope of that system's tort
law. Uniform law is uniform law and international obligations
are international obligations. To the extent of the CISG's cover-
age, the Contracting State has committed itself to uniform ap-
plication. There is no provision in the CISG for a state of the
art defense.
139 See CISG art. 74.
140 See CISG art. 35 (which is not expressed in terms of the seller's fault).
141 See CISG art. 79 (which refers to a party's "failure to perform any of his
obligations" and calls for proof that "the failure was due to an impediment beyond
his control". The view that this does not readily excuse non-negligent intermediate
sellers of defective goods is probably more acceptable to a common lawyer than to a
German civilian.). See also PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY ON THE CONVEN-
TION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 1980 (CISG) 606 (1998) ("a reasonable
person in the promisee's position could not have been aware of ... [the] non-con-
forming state [of the goods]").
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III. CONCLUSION
Different legal systems treat consumer and commercial in
different ways. I have sought to show that it is an oversimplifi-
cation to treat all commercial sales alike. Commodity sales are
unlike the sale of goods for commercial consumption and there-
fore, there is every reason to keep alive a special body of law
attuned to their particular character. I have laid stress on the
experience and extensive scope of English law suitable for the
governing of such contracts and as expressive of the parties'
choice, though I am not making a case to the effect that a spe-
cial international uniform law could not be devised for them
(but this hardly seems an urgent matter). In my view, the CISG
is not apt to deal with the problems they raise, though in this
setting I have not been able to demonstrate this by means of a
close textual analysis of the CISG. My view, incidentally, is not
based upon the absence from the CISG of mention of bills of
lading and trade terms such as CIF and FOB. These expres-
sions are not to be found in the contractual provisions of the UK
Sale of Goods Act. Within English sales law, the somewhat iso-
lated character of international commodities sales law lends
further support to the availability of a body of law outside the
CISG. I am not on this occasion making an argument for the
need for competition amongst different laws and the need for
contracting parties to have a genuine choice, though I believe
that the otherwise monolithic character of uniform law is bro-
ken down by the opportunity for parties to opt out and select a
law, or a portion of law, of their own choice.
Turning now to uniform law as expressed in the CISG, the
temptation to state Lao Tse's maxim that a journey of 1,000
miles starts with the first step is irresistible. The CISG is a
remarkable instrument whose influence has been felt at many
levels of the international and regional uniformity movement.
There is a challenge afoot to prevent it from being domesticated
by different legal systems, and that challenge may ultimately
fail. But as long as it remains the subject of intense scrutiny in
its day-to-day application, and to the: extent that it receives sup-
port from other instruments, the dangers of domestication are
diminished. It may be that voices will be raised that uniform
law is exterminating national legal culture, in much the same
way that the onward march of the English language is extermi-
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nating minority languages across the globe. It may be that my
own plea for differentiation can be seen as expressing prema-
ture nostalgia for the disappearance of my own national law.
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